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Mediation of Investor–State    
Disputes: A Treaty Survey 
Kun Fan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The concept of mediation is not new.  Long before law was established, courts 
were organized, or judges formulated law, people resolved their disputes informally 
through negotiation or mediation.  Historically, states also used mediation to resolve 
their conflicts.  In some cultures, such as China’s deeply rooted Confucian 
philosophy emphasizing harmony and conflict avoidance, mediation was used not 
an alternative, but an essential—and integral—part of the dispute resolution 
system.1 
In modern society, mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) regained popularity in reaction to the increasing proceduralization, 
formalization, and judicialization of arbitration,2 or the colonization of arbitration 
by litigation.3  This is particularly true in the field of investor–state disputes.  
Investor–state arbitration is becoming more confrontational, more lengthy and 
costly, and more judicialized.  The final result may be unsatisfying, even to a 
winning party.  For instance, in the case of Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican 
States,4 after winning a seventeen–million–dollar arbitral award against Mexico, the 
Chief Executive Officer of Metalclad expressed regret at having resorted to this 
mechanism.  He noted that despite “winning” the case, the arbitration had been so 
dissatisfying that he wished the company had relied on other options to resolve the 
dispute.5  The proceedings had spanned approximately five years, involved a battle 
in domestic courts, and the claimant’s side alone had an estimated four–million 
dollars in direct and indirect costs.6  No doubt there were considerable costs endured 
by Mexico as well.7  This case shows “how the nominal winner is often a real 
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 1. See KUN FAN, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A LEGAL AND CULTURAL ANALYSIS 194–203 (2013). 
 2. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & CHARLES N. BROWER, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS ‘JUDICIALIZATION’ AND UNIFORMITY?: TWELFTH 
SOKOL COLLOQUIUM ix (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1994). 
 3. Fali S. Nariman, The Spirit of Arbitration: The Tenth Annual Goff Lecture, 16 ARB. INT’L 261 
(2001). 
 4. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.  
 5. See Jack C. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor–State Disputes—
A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 7, 8–10 (2015). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time,” as President Abraham Lincoln 
famously noted.8 
In the widely discussed case of Achmea BV v. Slovakia, the arbitral tribunal 
remarked at the close of the hearing that it had a sense that, in this case, settlement 
“would be a good thing” because “the aims of both sides seem to be approximately 
aligned, and that the black and white solution of a legal decision in which one side 
wins and the other side loses is not the optimum outcome in this case.”9 
In light of some Governments’ and Non–Governmental Organizations’ 
(“NGOs”) increasing distrust of investor–state arbitration, mediation regained its 
momentum as a method of resolving investor–state disputes (“ISD”).  Consider, for 
example, the inclusion of mediation in the dispute settlement provisions of a 
growing number of international investment treaties (“IIAs”), including Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) and multilateral investment treaties.  
Mediation’s momentum is also reflected by the Convention on International 
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (“Singapore Convention”), a 
new multilateral framework for the recognition and enforcement of mediated 
settlements.10  The Singapore Convention opened for signature in August 2019 and 
has been signed by forty–six nations so far, including China and the U.S.11  
Although the Singapore Convention only applies to commercial disputes, the spirit 
and mechanism it embodies would apply with equal force to state–to–state and 
investor–state disputes.12 
In this context, what are the challenges and values of using mediation to resolve 
investor–state disputes?  What is the existing framework with respect to the use of 
mediation in investor–state disputes, including treaties and soft laws?  What will 
the future look like?  This Article intends to address these questions surrounding 
the use of mediation to resolve ISD.  Section II will explore the challenges of 
investor–state disputes.  Section III will then discuss why mediation might be 
particularly beneficial in the ISDS context.  Section IV will examine the existing 
legal framework with respect to investor–state mediation through an extensive 
treaty survey.  Section V looks at the “soft laws” that provide specific guidance on 
mediation for ISD.  Finally, Section VI concludes with prospects to the future. 
 
 8. See Roy P. Basler et al., Abraham Lincoln’s Notes for a Law Lecture, ABRAHAM LINCOLN ONLINE 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/lawlect.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2020); 
Thomas Newcomb Hyde, Lincoln, Legal Ethics and Success in Mediation, 24(7) HILLSBOROUGH 
COUNTY B. ASS’N LAW. 54 (2014), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.hillsbar.com/resource/resmgr/Docs/m
ag_sum2014.pdf. 
 9. Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.  2008–13, p. 14–15 (2012) 
(Vaughan Lowe, Albert Jan van den Berg, & V.V. Veeder, Arbs.). 
 10. United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 7 
August 2019, G.A. Res. A/73/198 (Sept. 12, 2020). 
 11. List of Signatory Countries, SINGAPORE CONVENTION ON MEDIATION, https://www.singaporeco
nvention.org/official-signatories.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
 12. Jaemin Lee, Speech at the Singapore Convention on Mediation Panel on the Negotiation of the 
Convention on Mediation (Aug. 7, 2019) (session report available at https://www.singaporeconvention.
org/assets/pdf/conference-reports/2-Report-Lunch-time-Panel.pdf). 
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II.  CHALLENGES OF MEDIATING                                                              
INVESTOR–STATE DISPUTES 
In a time of growing criticism of investor–state dispute settlement (“ISDS”), 
one may wonder why parties are not settling disputes more frequently as suggested 
by the tribunal in Achmea BV v. Slovakia.  The resistance to investor–state 
mediation may be due to the nature of the disputes, the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders, and the unavoidable political complexities. 
In order to better understand the key challenges preventing settlement, the 
National University of Singapore Centre for International Law, led by Christopher 
Thomas and Lucy Reed, conducted a survey in November 2016.13  The survey asked 
participants to rank twenty–nine possible obstacles to the settlement of investor–
state disputes.14  The survey revealed that the majority of participants—seventy 
percent—think the state is the party more reluctant to settle.15  The survey further 
identified the following as the key barrier to settlement in ISD: the desire to defer 
responsibility for decision–making to a third–party.16  It is no surprise that this 
particular obstacle was ranked first.  In mediation, the parties ultimately assume 
responsibility for the terms of the settlement.  In arbitration, on the other hand, 
responsibility is shifted to the tribunal who determines the outcome by its award.  
Therefore, in arbitration, it is easier to shift the responsibility and blame a tribunal 
for a forced, rather than voluntary, outcome. 
The second biggest obstacle identified in the survey was media coverage, 
which might cause a dispute to become even more politically inflamed, pressuring 
the state into taking a firmer stance.17  Yet another significant obstacle to settlement 
is fear: fear of public criticism (ranked third),18 fear of allegations of or future 
prosecution for corruption (ranked seventh),19 and fear of setting a precedent 
(ranked sixteenth).20 
Obstacles to settlement also arise from the structure of the state, namely the 
existence of multiple stakeholders in agencies and ministries across all levels of 
government.  It might be more difficult for an official to obtain budgetary approval 
for a settlement, as opposed to any sum awarded by an arbitral tribunal or court 
(ranked fourth).21  Agreement may prove impossible because of stakeholders’ 
conflicting and competing perspectives and priorities (ranked sixth).22 
Finally, we should bear in mind that not all disputes are suitable for mediation.  
In some cases, mediation is not a viable option—for example, when the dispute 
 
 13. Seraphina Chew, Lucy Reed, & J. Christopher Thomas, Report: Survey on Obstacles to Settlement 
of Investor–State Disputes, SSRN 1 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247492 (NUS Centre 
for International Law Research Paper No. 18/01).  The survey was sent to ninety–seven recipients known 
to have substantial personal experience in investor–state arbitration in November 2016.  The survey 
received forty–seven responses from private counsel, institutional representatives, and academics.  More 
than half of the participants (sixty–four percent) had experience advising both investor and state parties.  
Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 15–17. 
 17. Id. at 17. 
 18. Chew, Reed, & Thomas, supra note 13, at 18. 
 19. Id. at 28. 
 20. Id. at 29. 
 21. Id. at 19. 
 22. Id. at 28. 
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involves an issue that is highly sensitive, politicized, or too far reaching and could 
thus potentially affect too many third–parties (ranked fifth).23  In the survey, 
participants offered a number of examples to illustrate this obstacle.  One recent, 
highly–publicized case is instructive: Philip Morris Asia’s claim against Australia.24  
One participant observed that the Australian government could “never have settled 
his dispute, because of the asset class (tobacco), the nature of the measures (plain 
packaging regulations for tobacco products) and what would have been involved in 
settlement (monetary compensation to a tobacco company or reversal of the relevant 
regulations).”25 
III.  WHY MEDIATION IS BENEFICIAL                                                                        
IN THE ISDS CONTEXT 
Despite the potential challenges posed by mediation, it presents a credible and 
compelling option for both investors and states to settle disputes arising from 
investment activities.   Some of the values of mediation for ISD are discussed below. 
Mediation offers an appealing alternative to arbitration, particularly in light of 
the dissatisfaction with investor–state arbitration.  Professor Coe suggests that it is 
the uncertainty of an adjudicated result that maintains the parties’ interest in 
engineering, with the assistance of the conciliator, an acceptable alternative 
outcome.26  Mediation also address concerns about the legitimacy of private 
arbitrators rendering a decision against state’s regulatory acts, a frequent criticism 
of investor–state arbitration.  In mediation, it is the disputing parties who are the 
decision makers; if they cannot come to a settlement agreement, the mediator has 
no authority to impose a decision on the parties.27 
Mediation offers investors and states the opportunity to resolve their disputes 
themselves, which can prove to be speedier and less costly than arbitration.  This is 
particularly useful in the context of ISD where the median length of arbitration 
proceedings is four years and four months and median costs are just over four–
million dollars for claimants and almost three–and–a–half million for respondents.28 
Mediation also allows for broader economic goals, appropriately construing the 
positive impact investment projects can have for both the investor and the host state 
and avoiding the escalation of politically sensitive disputes.  The collaborative spirit 
of mediation allows the parties to avoid win–lose outcomes while moving beyond 
the narrow legal dispute towards a bargain that benefits both sides.  It may also 
permit the investment relationship to continue if the investors and states use the 
process to share important information and “take advantage of the opportunity to 
build trust in each other, or at least reduce distrust.”29 
 
 23. Id. at 2. 
 24. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012–
12 (2015) (Karl–Heinz Böckstiegel, Gabrielle Kaufmann–Kohler, & Donald M. McRae, Arbs.). 
 25. Chew, Reed, & Thomas, supra note 13, at 20. 
 26. Coe, supra note 5, at 16. 
 27. James Claxton, Compelling Parties to Mediate Investor–State Disputes: No Pressure, No 
Diamonds?, 20 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 78 (2020). 
 28. Id. at 7 (citing to Damaged & Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration Revisited, GLOBAL 
ARBITRATION REVIEW (Dec. 14, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151755/damages-
and-costs-in-investment-treaty-arbitration-revisited). 
 29. Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 77 (2013). 
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Furthermore, mediation may be better suited to the participation of non–party 
stakeholders, who may not have standing to participate in the arbitration process.  
Participation of these non–parties in the mediation process may assist with the 
implementation of any agreements that are reached. 
In the investor–state context, the confidentiality, procedural flexibility, and 
range of outcome choices make mediation even more attractive, as does the 
possibility of using mediation in tandem with the existing arbitration structure, 
notably during treaty–imposed “cooling–off” periods.  Additionally, as a less 
adversarial means of dispute resolution, mediation might alleviate certain concerns 
of investors, especially foreign ones, who might otherwise be hesitant to sue the 
government. 
The issue of increased use of mediation for resolving investor–state disputes, 
then, is not a matter of whether and when but, rather, how.  Even if a complete 
settlement is not achieved, mediation may open lines of communication for 
subsequent negotiations and/or narrow issues for future arbitration. 
IV.  THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
According to Investment Policy Hub’s database, out of 2,572 bilateral 
investment treaties (“BIT”), 624 provide for mediation or conciliation for investor–
state dispute settlement (“ISDS”), which comprises twenty–four percent of all 
BITs.30  Based on a comprehensive treaty survey examining the mediation clauses 
contained in the existing IIAs, this Article found that the integration of mediation 
into ISDS systems is becoming more frequently reflected in IIAs. 
A.  Availability of Mediation in the “Cooling Off”                                 
Period of Investment Arbitration 
The vast majority of BITs allow a period for amicable settlement or 
negotiation, called a “cooling–off” period, during which the parties are invited to 
find an amicable settlement to their dispute.  Some treaties are silent about the 
methods and processes available to the parties.  Several countries, however, have 
consistently referred to mediation or conciliation in their treaty practice as one of 
the ways to reach an amicable settlement during this cooling–off period. 
B. Mediation as an Alternative to Arbitration 
A more recent generation of treaties, particularly those with a broader 
substantive scope and coverage than earlier treaties, have singled out mediation as 
available to the disputing parties to reach an amicable settlement at all stages and 
regardless of whether an investment arbitration is under way.  It is also interesting 
to note that the recent treaties and model BITs range from a simple mention of 
mediation as one of the non–binding procedures to the more specific and conducive 
language about investor–state mediation, and some even incorporate 
comprehensive procedure rules of mediation. 
 
 30. INT’L INV. AGREEMENTS NAVIGATOR, INV. POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
IIA/mappedContent#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
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1. Reference to Mediation as a                                                                   
Non–Binding Procedure 
Mediation has been referred to as a non–binding procedures in a number of 
model BITs, enacted BITs, and multilateral treaties.   
i.  Model BITs 
A number of recent Model BITs encourage the use of conciliation or mediation 
as one of the non–binding, third–party procedures.  Below are a few examples. 
Article 14.2 of the Norway draft Model BIT 2015 provides that “[a]ny dispute 
under this Article shall, if possible, be settled amicably.  A Party and an investor of 
the other Party may agree to non–binding procedures including good offices, 
conciliation or mediation.”31 
Article 29.1 of the Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) 
Model BIT 2012 states that “[i]n the event of an investment dispute between an 
Investor or its Investment and a Host State pursuant to this Agreement, the Investor 
and the Host State should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation 
and negotiation, which may include the use of nonbinding, third–party mediation 
or other mechanisms.”32 
Article 13 of China Model BIT 2010 says, “[a]ny legal dispute between an 
investor of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party in connecting with 
an investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall, as far as possible, 
be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the dispute, which 
includes mediation.”33 
Article 20 of the Austria Model BIT 2008 states that “[d]isputes between the 
Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement 
shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably or through consultations, mediation or 
conciliation.”34 
The above Model BITs only mention mediation as one of the possible means 
to amicably settle the disputes between investors and states.  The models provide 
no further guidance with respect to mediation procedure.  In contrast, the Thailand 
Model BIT contains more specific language about the start and termination of the 
procedures for conciliation or mediation and emphasizes the confidential and 
without prejudice nature of these non–binding procedures.35  Article 10.4 of the 
Thailand Model BIT 2012 says: 
 
 31. Norway Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 14.2, 2015. 
 32. SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary art. 19.1, July 2012. 
 33. This Model BIT has not been officially published.  Reference is made in some academic articles,  
such as Chunlei Zhao, Investor–State Mediation in a China–E.U. Bilateral Investment Treaty: Talking 
About Being in the Right Place at the Right Time, 17 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 111, 124–25 (2018), quoting 
Xiantao Wen 温先涛, Discussion on “China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty” (draft 1) 《中国投资
保护协定范本》(草案)论稿(一), 18(4) GUO JI JING JI FA XUE KAN 《国际经济法学刊》169–204 
(2011); Xiantao Wen 温先涛, Discussion on “China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty” (draft 2) 《中
国投资保护协定范本》(草案)论稿(二), 19(1) GUO JI JING JI FA XUE KAN 《国际经济法学刊》132–
61 (2011); Xiantao Wen 温先涛, Discussion on “China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty” (draft 3) 《
中国投资保 护协定范本》 (草案)论稿(三), 19 GUO JI JING JI FA XUE KAN 《国际经济法学刊》57–
90 (2011). 
 34. Austria Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 20, 2008. 
 35. Thailand Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 10.4, May 2012. 
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The disputing parties may at any time agree to good offices, conciliation 
or mediation.  Procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may 
begin at any time and may be terminated at any time.  Such procedures 
may continue while the matter is being examined by an arbitral tribunal 
established under this Article, unless the disputing parties agree otherwise.  
Proceedings involving good offices, conciliation and mediation and 
positions taken by the disputing parties during these proceedings shall be 
confidential and without prejudice to the rights of the disputing investor in 
any further or other proceedings.36 
Interestingly, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (“IISD”) 
Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development 2006 
contains detailed provisions with respect to the prevention of disputes, the use 
mediation to seek amicable resolutions, and even the procedures for the 
appointment of mediators.37  Subparts C through F of Article 42 on Prevention of 
Disputes and Mediation state, in relevant part,  as follows: 
Investors and investments shall . . . seek to resolve potential disputes with 
host states, and host states with their investors and investments, in an 
amicable manner, prior to and during the cooling–off period.  The use of 
good offices, conciliation, mediation or any other agreed dispute resolution 
process may be applied.  Where no alternative means of dispute settlement 
are agreed upon, Parties, investors or investments . . . shall seek the 
assistance of a mediator to resolve disputes during the [required] cooling–
off period . . .  The potential disputants shall use a mediator from the list 
established by the Secretariat for this purpose, or another one of their joint 
choosing. . . .  If no mediator is chosen by the disputing parties prior to 
three months before the expiration of the cooling–off period, the Director 
of the Council shall appoint a mediator from the Secretariat list who is not 
a national of a State Party or the investor . . .  The Parties may also establish 
regionally–based mediation centres to facilitate the resolution of disputes 
between Parties and investors or investments, taking into account regional 
customs and traditions.38 
ii.  BITs 
Mediation is also provided in a number of bilateral treaties, including BITs and 
FTAs.  For instance, Article 12(1) of Switzerland/Egypt BIT 2010 provides that: 
Disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party relating to an investment of the latter in the territory of 
the former, which concern an alleged breach of this Agreement 
(hereinafter referred to as “investment dispute”) shall, . . . to the extent 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. HOWARD MANN ET AL., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 58 (2005). 
 38. Id. 
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possible, be settled through consultation, negotiation or mediation 
(hereinafter referred to “procedure of amicable settlement”).39 
Article 10(1) of the Egypt/Mauritius BIT 2014 largely mirrors the language of 
Article 12(1) of Switzerland/Egypt BIT 2010, but adds “conciliation” to the list of 
settlement procedures available to the parties “after written notification of the 
alleged breach has been made.40 
Article 20.1 of the Chile–Hong Kong, China SAR BIT 2016 says, “[i]n the 
event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the respondent shall initially seek 
to resolve the dispute through consultations, which may include, where this is 
acceptable to the disputing parties, the use of non–binding, third–party procedures, 
such as good offices, conciliation and mediation.”41 
Article 9.16 of the FTA between the Republic of Korea and the Republics of 
Central America 2018 provides: 
Any dispute arising in accordance with Article 9.17.1 shall be settled, to 
the extent possible, by consultation and negotiation, which may include 
the use of non–binding, third party procedures such as conciliation and 
mediation, and shall be notified by submitting a notice of the dispute in 
writing, including detailed information of the factual and legal basis, by 
the investor to the Party receiving the investment.42 
Different from the above bilateral treaties with only a reference to mediation, 
the Investment Agreement signed between Mainland China and Hong Kong on June 
28, 2017 under the framework of the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (“CEPA”) establishes a mediation mechanism to resolve 
investment disputes and provides detailed guidance for the use of mediation and the 
appointment of mediators, with reference to specific mediation institutions.43  Hong 
Kong and Macau investors may, pursuant to Article 19 of the CEPA Investment 
Agreement, apply to the mediation agency handling disputes between Mainland 
China investors and the Hong Kong party for mediation of investment disputes 
between the specific department or agency implementing the specific administrative 
act in Mainland China.44  Mainland investors, on the other hand, are eligible to apply 
for mediation to mediation institutions that deal with disputes arising between 
Mainland investors and a Hong Kong department or agency pursuant to Article 20 
of the CEPA Investment Agreement.45   
 
 39. Agreement between The Swiss Confederation and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 12, June 7, 2010. 
 40. The Investment Promotion Act art. 10.1, June 25, 2014. 
 41. Investment Agreement Between the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile art. 20.1, Sept. 
7, 2012. 
 42. Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Korea and the Republics of Central America art. 
9.16, Feb. 21, 2018. 
 43. Mainland & Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement Investment Agreement art. 
19.1(v), Jan. 1, 2018. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Mainland & Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement Investment Agreement art. 
20(iv), Jan. 1, 2018. 
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The two Mainland mediation institutions approved to deal with the disputes 
between Hong Kong investors and the Mainland or Mainland investors and Hong 
Kong are the Mediation Center of the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade/the China Chamber of International Commerce, and China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”).  The two 
Hong Kong institutions are the Hong Kong Mediation Commission (“HKMC”) of 
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre and the Mainland–Hong Kong 
Joint Mediation Center (“MHJMC”).46 
iii.  Multilateral Treaties 
A few recently concluded multilateral treaties also provide for the use of 
mediation of investor–state disputes.  For instance, the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans–Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”) mentions 
conciliation or mediation as a means to resolve investor state disputes.47  
Specifically, the CPTPP states that “in the event of an investment dispute, the 
claimant and the respondent should initially seek to resolve the dispute through 
consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of non–binding, third party 
procedures, such as good offices, conciliation or mediation.”48 
Article 10.15 of the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade 
Agreement 2004 says, “[i]n the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the 
respondent should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and 
negotiation, which may include the use of non–binding, third–party procedures such 
as conciliation and mediation.”49 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement 2009 contains more specific language with respect to 
conciliation.  Article 30 provides as follows: 
1. The disputing parties may at any time agree to conciliation, which 
may begin at any time and be terminated at the request of the disputing 
investor at any time. 
 
2. If the disputing parties agree, procedures for conciliation may 
continue while procedures provided for in Article 33 (Submission of 
a Claim) are in progress. 
 
3. Proceedings involving conciliation and positions taken by the 
disputing parties during these proceedings shall be without prejudice 
to the rights of either disputing parties in any further proceedings.50 
 
 46. Mainland & Hong Kong Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), TRADE & INDUSTRY DEP’T 
OF THE GOV’T OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/inv
estment/mediation.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
 47. See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans–Pacific Partnership art. 9.18, Dec. 30, 
2018 (the CPTPP was signed in Santiago, Chile, on March 8, 2018.  It entered into force for Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore on December 30, 2018, and for Vietnam on January 
14, 2019.  The CPTPP will enter into force for Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, and Peru sixty days 
after they complete their respective ratification processes). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement art. 10.15, Aug. 5, 2004. 
 50. ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 30, 2009. 
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The Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (“COMESA”)_Common Investment Area 2007 contains language similar to 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development (“IISD”) Model 
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development 2006 with 
respect to the use of mediation.  In Particular, Article 26 deals with negotiation and 
mediation, and states: 
4. Where no alternative means of dispute settlement are agreed upon, a 
party shall seek the assistance of a mediator to resolve disputes during 
the cooling–off period required under this Agreement between the 
notice of intention and the initiation of dispute settlement proceedings 
under Articles 27 or 28.  The potential disputants shall use a mediator 
from the list established by the COMESA Secretariat for this purpose, 
or another one of their joint choosing.  Recourse to mediation does not 
alter the minimum cooling–off period. 
5. If no mediator is chosen by the disputing parties prior to three months 
before the expiration of the cooling–off period, the President of the 
COMESA Court of Justice or his designate shall appoint a mediator 
from the COMESA Secretariat’s list who is not a national of the 
Member State of the COMESA investor or the Member State(s) party 
to the dispute.  The appointment shall be binding on the disputing 
parties.51 
 
The above examples show a general trend to include mediation as an option to 
resolve investor–state disputes in model BITs, recently concluded BITs, and 
multilateral treaties.  Some provide only a simple mention of mediation as one of 
the non–binding procedures, while others provide more detailed guidelines as to the 
nature of mediation or the procedures for the appointment of mediators. 
2.  Incorporation of Comprehensive                                                  
Procedural Rules of Mediation 
Another trend appears in the E.U.’s recently concluded agreement, which 
incorporates a set of comprehensive rules of investor–state mediation.  For instance, 
the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(“CETA”) of 2016 contains specific language on mediation of investor–state 
disputes, including temporal availability of mediation and mediator appointment, 
and incorporates a Code of Conduct for Mediators, as well as procedural rules of 
mediation.52  Article 8.20 of the CETA provides as follows: 
1. The disputing parties may at any time agree to have recourse to 
mediation. 
 
 51. Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area art. 26.4–5, 2007. 
   52. The Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Oct. 30, 
2016. 
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2. Recourse to mediation is without prejudice to the legal position or 
rights of either disputing party. . . 
3. The mediator is appointed by agreement of the disputing parties. The 
disputing parties may also request that the Secretary General of ICSID 
appoint the mediator. 
4. The disputing parties shall endeavour to reach a resolution of the 
dispute within 60 days the appointment of the mediator. 
5. If the disputing parties agree to have recourse to mediation, Articles 
8.19.6 and 8.19.8 shall not apply from the date on which the disputing 
parties agreed to have recourse to mediation to the date on which 
either disputing party decides to terminate the mediation.  A decision 
by a disputing party to terminate the mediation shall be transmitted by 
way of a letter to the mediator and the other disputing party.53 
 
Annex 29–B provides for a Code of Conduct for arbitrators, including 
disclosure obligations, duties of arbitrators, independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators, confidentiality, and more.54  The Code of Conduct applies, mutatis 
mutandis, to mediators. 
Annex 29–C sets out detailed rules of procedure for mediation, including 
initiation of the proceeding (Article 2), selection of the mediator (Article 3), rules 
of procedure for mediation (Article 4), implementation (Article 5), confidentiality 
(Article 6), time limits (Article 7), costs (Article 8), and review (Article 9).55 
Similarly, the EU– Singapore Investment Protection Agreement of 2018 also 
sets out detailed procedural rules of mediation.56  Chapter 15 is dedicated to the 
mediation mechanism, covering specific issues regarding the objective and scope 
of mediation, initiation of the procedure, selection of the mediator, procedural rules 
of the mediation, implementation of a mutually agreed upon solution, time limits, 
costs, and review.57  A Mediation Mechanism for Disputes between Investors and 
Parties is also included in Annex 6, which incorporates detailed procedural rules of 
mediation.58 
EU–Vietnam trade and investment agreements from 2018 contain almost 
identical language to the 2018 EU–Singapore Investment Agreement with respect 
to dispute resolution59 and the mediation mechanism.60 
 
 53. Id. at art. 8.20.  
 54. Id. at Annex 29–B.  
 55. Id. at Annex 29–C.  
 56. EU–Singapore Trade and Investment Protection Agreements, Oct. 19, 2018.  
 57. Id. at chapter 15.  
 58. Id. at Annex 6. 
 59. Compare EU–Singapore Trade and Investment Protection Agreements, Oct. 19, 2018 with EU–
Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements, Sept. 24, 2018. 
 60. Id.  
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V.  SOFT LAWS: SPECIFIC GUIDELINES FOR                                                        
THE MEDIATION PROCESS 
Apart from the treaties, international institutions have also taken various efforts 
to promote the use of mediation for ISDS by including specific guidelines for the 
mediation process through its soft laws, such as the ICC, Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (“SCC”), the International Bar Association (“IBA”), Energy Chartered 
Treaty (“ECT”), the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”), and the International Mediation Institute (“IMI”).61 
A.  The IBA Rules for Investor–State Mediation 
A clear indication of the change in attitude by governments, multi–nationals, 
and institutions came in the form of the IBA Rules for Investor–State Mediation 
adopted by the IBA Council on October 4, 2012.62  Such adoption was a clear 
attempt by a variety of stakeholders to set out a framework by which mediation 
could be utilized in ISD, thereby avoiding the need for arbitration.  The IBA Rules 
for Investor–State Mediation provide for co–mediation and early management 
conferences to assure the viability of the process.63  The Rules also provide for 
concurrent mediation and arbitration proceedings.64 
None of the treaties I have examined so far expressly adopt the 2012 IBA Rules.  
There has been one reported mediation case conducted pursuant to the IBA Rules 
under the auspices of the ICC International Centre for ADR: Systra SA v. Republic 
of the Philippines.65  The dispute brought by Systra SA and its local subsidiary, 
Systra Philippines, Inc., arises out of allegedly long overdue invoices for services 
and work performed on infrastructure projects (including metro and rail projects) 
for various government agencies of the Philippines.66  In an effort to avoid 
arbitration, the parties agreed to conduct a mediation pursuant to the 2012 IBA 
Rules at the ICC–ADR Centre.67 
There may also be room for mediation proceedings conducted under the IBA 
Rules within the ICSID conciliation and arbitration framework.  As the IBA 
Mediation Rules are not mutually exclusive with the ICSID Conciliation Rules, nor 
with the ICSID Arbitration Rules, ICSID Senior Legal Counsel Frauke Nitschke 
argues that the IBA Rules can be applied (a) at a preliminary stage; (b) alongside 
ICSID arbitration or conciliation; (c) following an ICSID arbitration or conciliation; 
or (d) as a standalone process.68 
 
 61. INT’L MEDIATION INST., https://www.imimediation.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
 62. Int’l Bar Ass’n, Rules for Investor–State Mediation, art. 1, 1 (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.ibanet.org 
/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Mediation/State_Mediation/Default.aspx. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Id. at 6. 
 65. For details of the case, see Luke E. Peterson, In an Apparent First, Investor & Host–State Agree 
to Try Mediation Under IBA Rules to Resolve an Investor Treaty Dispute, IA INV. ARBITRATION 
REPORTER (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-an-apparent-first-investor-and-host-
state-agree-to-try-mediation-under-iba-rules-to-resolve-an-investment-treaty-dispute/. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Frauke Nitschke, The IBA’s Investor–State Mediation Rules and the ICSID Dispute Settlement 
Framework, 29 ICSID REV. 112 (Winter 2014). 
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B.  ECT Guideline on Investment                                                            
Mediation (2016) 
In July of 2016, the Energy Charter Conference adopted the Guide on 
Investment Mediation.69  This Guide is an “explanatory document” designed to 
encourage States and investors to actively consider mediation for investor–state 
disputes.70  The Guide covers a range of matters, including the rules which may 
apply to mediation proceedings, the likely structure of a mediation, and the 
enforceability of any resulting settlement agreement.71  The Guide also canvasses 
the key differences between existing mediation or conciliation rules.72  The Energy 
Charter Conference also encouraged its Contracting Parties to consider mediation 
as a possible option at any stage of the dispute to facilitate an amicable resolution.73 
1.  ICSID Draft Mediation Rules 
ICSID has been supportive of the resolution of investment disputes through 
conciliation and mediation.  Indeed, the creation of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSD”) was based on World Bank’s 
experience in conciliation through a few high–profile investment disputes in the 
1950s and 1960s, and conciliation was viewed as a focal point when the ICSID was 
established.74  Much to the surprise of founders of the ICSID, however, states 
showed little interest in ICSID’s conciliation services and instead preferred 
arbitration and began concluding investment contracts and treaties with ICSID 
arbitration clauses, resulting in the rapid escalation of arbitrations in the 1990s until 
the present day.75 
Despite the relatively slow increase in the number of conciliations compared to 
arbitrations registered at the ICSD, the Center kept actively promoting the use of 
conciliation and mediation to resolve ISD by organizing various events, seminars, 
and trainings on ISM.  In 2018, ICSID began work on a new set of mediation rules.76  
As part of a broader effort to update and further modernize the ICSID’s procedural 
rules for resolving investment disputes, these will be the first institutional mediation 
rules designed specifically for investment disputes. 
On August 16, 2019, the ICSID Secretariat published its third working paper 
on proposals for rule amendments, which builds on the proposals that were 
originally published in August 2018 and March 2019 and follows extensive 
consultations with ICSID Member States and the public.77  The third working paper 
includes the Rules of Mediation Proceedings (“ICSID Mediation Rules”) and the 
 
 69. INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, GUIDE ON INVESTMENT MEDIATION (2016). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 8 (2017). 
 75. Claxton, supra note 27, at 5. 
 76. Investor–State Mediation, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/adr-mechanisms-
-mediation.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
 77. ICSID Rules & Regulations Amendment Process, ICSID https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendm
ents (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
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Additional Facility Rules of Procedure for Mediation Proceedings (“Additional 
Facility Mediation Rules”).78 
The mediation rules complement ICSID’s existing rules for arbitration, 
conciliation, and fact–finding and may be used either independently of, or in 
conjunction with, arbitration or conciliation proceedings.79  Overall, the goal is for 
ICSID to provide parties with a range of effective dispute settlement options which 
may be used on their own or in combination with each other.80 
If the parties reach an amicable settlement through mediation during an 
arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal may record the settlement in 
the form of an award pursuant to Rule 54 (2) of the Arbitration Rules for the ICSID 
Convention (in the proposed amendment).  The settlement agreement would then 
benefit from the delocalized enforcement mechanism that is unique to the ICSID 
Convention.81  The mediation rules also align with Singapore Convention, meaning 
a settlement agreement reached through the mediation process meets the Singapore 
Convention’s requirements for enforceability.82  Once finalized and approved by 
ICSID Member States, the mediation rules will add a valuable dispute settlement 
option for states and investors.83 
2.  The IMI’s Competency Criteria for                                             
Investor–State Mediators 
Finally, in light of the lack of accredited or identifiable investor–state mediators 
from which parties can choose their mediator or co–mediators, the IMI’s Investor–
State Mediation Taskforce has created a Competency Criteria for Investor–State 
Mediators (“Competency Criteria”).84 
The Competency Criteria lays out a series of areas in which the ideal investor–
state mediator would be competent, including both a familiarity with various tools 
and technologies and knowledge of the particular industry.85  Specific areas are as 
follows: (1) understanding of investor–state issues; (2) experience in mediation and 
other dispute resolution processes; (3) experience with different forms of 
negotiation, mediation, and conciliation; (4) understanding of arbitration and 
adjudication processes; (5) intercultural competency; and (6) other competencies.86  
These Criteria could assist parties, institutions, designating authorities, and other 
appointing bodies in selecting competent and suitable mediators or co–mediators. 
 
 78. Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, 1 INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP. 2 
(Working Paper No. 3, Aug. 2019), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_3_VOLUME_1_E
NGLISH.pdf. 
 79. ICSID’s Role in Advancing Investor–State Mediation, ICSID https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Page
s/resources/ICSID’s-Role-in-Advancing-Investor-State-Mediation (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. What Has the Investor–State Taskforce Achieved so Far?, INT’L MEDIATION INST. (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.imimediation.org/about/who-are-imi/ism-tf/. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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VI.  LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
Looking into the future, mediation may offer a “soft” opening of the otherwise 
increasingly formalized and proceduralized arbitration proceedings, particularly in 
the context of investor–state disputes.  Various initiatives have been taken in the 
past decade to promote the use of mediation to resolve international investment 
disputes, including the inclusion of the dispute settlement provisions in a growing 
number of IIAs and the increasing number of soft laws providing guidance on the 
use of mediation for ISD.  The ratification of the Singapore Convention will also 
incentivize the use of mediation by enabling disputing parties to easily enforce and 
invoke settlement agreements across borders. 
Below is an excerpt from a speech by Sir Anthony Clarke.  He pushed for civil 
justice reform, but I think his words are also appropriate in the context of promoting 
mediation for ISD: 
It is of course a cliché that you can take a horse to water but whether it 
drinks is another thing entirely.  That it is a cliché does not render it the 
less true.  But what can perhaps be said is that a horse (even a very 
obstinate horse) is more likely to drink if taken to water.  We should be 
doing more to encourage (and perhaps direct) the horse to go to the trough 
(trôf). The more horses approach the trough the more will drink from it.  
Litigants being like horses we should give them every assistance to settle 
their disputes in this way.  We do them, and the justice system, a disservice 
if we do not.87 
Perhaps it is now time to take the horse to the trough.  We should be doing 
more to encourage litigants to use mediation to settle their ISD.  The more we do, 


















 87. Anthony Clarke, The Future of Civil Mediation, Speech to the Civil Mediation Council’s Nat’l 
Conference (May 8, 2008). 
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